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Abstract
Cooperative Parrondo’s games on a regular two dimensional lattice are analyzed
based on the computer simulations and on the discrete-time Markov chain model
with exact transition probabilities. The paradox appears in the vicinity of the prob-
abilites characterisitic of the ”voter model”, suggesting practical applications. As in
the one-dimensional case, winning and the occurrence of the paradox depends on
the number of players.
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1 Introduction
Parrondo’s games, inspired by the flashing Brownian ratchet, represent coin
flipping games leading to an apparently paradoxical property that alternating
plays of two losing games can produce a winning outcome [1]. Two types of
games, each played by only one player, are involved denoted as game A and
game B. In the former only one biased coin is used while in the latter two
biased coins are used with the player’s current capital determining the state
dependent rule. On average, when played individually each game causes the
player to lose. However, when two games are played in any combination, on
average the player always wins. More specifically, in game A a biased coin
with probability of landing head up is pA < 1/2, and assuming that the initial
capital is C = 0, after n plays the expected value of the capital is 〈C〉 = n(2
pA− 1) < 0. The game B is played with coins B0 and B1 with probabilities of
landing head up of p0 and p1 respectively. The coin B0 is flipped when C ≡
0(mod 3) and coin B1 otherwise. The quantities of the Brownian ratchets may
be made analogous to the variables figuring in Parrondo’s games. For example,
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the displacement of the particles corresponds to the capital amount after a
certain number of games. The potential of the Brownian ratchets (usually
electrostatic) is analogous to the games rules, which define the shape of the
potential. A comprehensive review of Parrondo’s paradox and references is
given in [2].
Several variations of these games have been introduced extending the range of
applicability of games possessing the same, apparently paradoxical property as
the original ones. In [3], capital dependence in game B was replaced by recent
history of wins and loses which in turn inspired the setting in [4] where the
capital dependence in game B was replaced by spatial neighbor dependence.
The latter games, termed cooperative, are played by N number of players as a
contrast to the original games which are played by only one player. Each of N
players, arranged in a circle (since periodic boundary conditions are assumed),
owns a capital Ci(t), i = 1, ..., N , which evolves by combined playing of games
A and B. Game A is the same as in the original setup, namely it consists of
repeatedly flipping a biased coin A so that the cumulative capital of all players
decreases in time. Game B depends on the winning or losing state of the
neighbors on both sides of the player whose turn is to play. It was shown that
the outcome is the same as in the original games, namely that alternation of
games A and B, which may be losing or fair when played individually, leads to a
winning temporal evolution of the total capital of all players. Recognizing that
the spatial dependent games may be played in an asynchronous manner (each
player, chosen randomly or in any other way, plays when his turn comes) and in
a synchronous manner (all players play at the same time), we have developed a
theoretical, discrete-time Markov chain model of cooperative games with exact
rules that allow computation of transition probabilities for arbitrary number
of players [5], [6]. For these games, termed one-dimensional asynchronous and
one-dimensional synchronous games, rigorous results were obtained for a small
number of players (N ≤ 12) since analytical expressions increase in complexity
for larger N . Exploration of paradoxical properties of cooperative Parrondo’s
games naturally extends to the two-dimensional case which may prove to be
of considerable practical importance, surpassing from that aspect the one-
dimensional case. As will be shown in this exposition two-dimensional games
share some properties with the one-dimensional ones, namely the probabilities
for which the paradox occurs depend on the number of players. Moreover, the
paradox occurs for a large number of sets of which a fairly large quantity
exists in the vicinity of probability values corresponding to the well know
voter model 1 .
1 The voter model is a simple mathematical model of opinion formation in which
voters are located at the nodes of a network. Each voter has an opinion (in the
simplest case either 0 or 1), and randomly chosen voter assumes an opinion of the
majority of its neighbors
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The paper is organized in the following manner: Following a short presen-
tation of essential rules of the games, we show how a probability transition
matrix may be obtained from the corresponding matrix of the one dimensional
case. Results of computer simulations for the asynchronous and synchronous
cases are presented next and we conclude with suggestions for possible new
directions and applications of these games.
2 Features of the Games
2.1 Rules and mathematical notation
Each player (or a spin-like particle) may be in one of two states: state 0
(”loser”) or state 1 (”winner”). The state of the ensemble of M players, in
one-dimensional case, may be represented as a binary string s = (s1, ..., sM),
si ∈ (0, 1) of length M , or equivalently, as state s in decimal notation. Pe-
riodic boundary conditions are assumed so that sM+1 = s1. To each state s
corresponds a vector equivalent to a basis vector |s〉 in P = 2M dimensional
state space
SP = {|s〉 | s = 0, 1, ..., P − 1}.
For example, when M = 3 and P = 8, state (011) is equivalent to the state
3, and the corresponding vector is |3〉 = (00010000)T , while state (111) is
equivalent to state 7 and the corresponding vector is |7〉 = (00000001)T .
It is easy to generalize this representation to a two dimensional M ×N array
of players located at the nodes of a two-dimensional lattice, in which case
the dimension of the state space becomes P = 2M×N . For example in the
simplest configuration when there are 4 players arranged in a 2× 2 lattice, the
state space is 16-dimensional and the correspondences are illustrated by the
following examples:


0 0
0 0

 = (0 0 0 0), in decimal notation 0; ←→ |0〉 = (1000000000000000)T


1 0
1 0

 = (1 0 1 0), in decimal notation 10; ←→ |10〉 = (0000000000100000)T
Game A is the same as in the classical setup, while probabilities of winning
in game B depend on the present state of the left and right neighbors (one-
dimensional case) or the four nearest neighbors (two-dimensional case). For
the two-dimensional case five possible configurations of neighboring players
surrounding the player whose turn is to play the game is presented in Fig. 1.
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Configuration of neighboring players may be denoted as an ordered set (sj−1
sk−1 sj+1 sk+1), where the indices k − 1, k + 1, j − 1 and j + 1 denote the
state of neighbors to the left, right, up and below respectively, of a player
who is about to play the game. Hence, the probabilities corresponding to
configurations presented in Fig. 1 are:
• p
(B)
0 when (sj−1 sk−1 sj+1 sk+1) = (0 0 0 0)
• p
(B)
1 when (sj−1 sk−1 sj+1 sk+1) = (0 0 0 1)
• p
(B)
2 when (sj−1 sk−1 sj+1 sk+1) = (0 0 1 1)
• p
(B)
3 when (sj−1 sk−1 sj+1 sk+1) = (0 1 1 1)
• p
(B)
4 when (sj−1 sk−1 sj+1 sk+1) = (1 1 1 1).
It should be remarked that p
(B)
1 applies to any state with only
one winner in the neighborhood, so that, from the aspect of the player who
is about to play, the states (0 0 0 1), (0 0 1 0), (0 1 0 0) and (1 0 0 0) are
equivalent (or four fold degenerate). States (0 0 1 1) and (0 1 1 1) are six and
four fold degenerate respectively.
2.2 Evolution of Probabilities
Winning or losing in any particular game leaves a player in state 1 (”winner”)
or state 0 (”loser”) respectively. This state remains in effect until he gets a
random chance to play again in the case of asynchronous play or it changes in
each round of synchronous games. Following a play by one of the players, the
state of the ensemble has changed from a state s(t) at time t to state s(t+ 1)
at time t + 1. If the probability that an ensemble in state s(t) (or |s(t)〉) is
pis(t), then the probability distribution pi(t) at time t is:
|pi(t)〉 =
P∑
s=0
pis(t) |s〉 , (1)
while the corresponding probability distribution evolution equation is
|pi(t+ 1)〉 = T |pi(t)〉 , (2)
where T is the probability transition matrix.
Capital C(t) is a function of the ensemble of players which is incremented
by 1 or decremented by 1 if one of the players wins or loses respectively. We
introduce the vector of the capital |C〉 whose components (their number is
equal to the number of ensemble states) represent the capital generated by
each ensemble state. Each component Cs of |C〉 represents normalized capital
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generated by that specific state which is equal to the sum of all winning and
losing individual states in a given ensemble state. Hence, the state 0 generates
capital −1, while the state 1 generates capital +1. Explicitly,
Cs =
1
N¯
N¯∑
i=1
(−1)si+1, (3)
so that the elements of |C〉 are average values of the capital generated by each
ensemble state separately. For example for N¯ = M ×N = 4, the vector of the
capital is
|C〉 = 1/4 (−4 − 2 − 2 0 − 2 0 0 2 − 2 0 0 2 0 2 2 4)T . (4)
The fifth component of |C〉 , for example, −2 corresponds to the state 4 = (0
1 0 0). The ensemble switching from any state s(t) to the state s(t + 1) =
4, generates an average capital |C(t+ 1)〉 = 〈C | 4〉 = −2/4 = −1/2. Fur-
thermore, an ensemble remaining in state 4 throughout its temporal evolution
would on the average generate capital −1/2 in each turn of the game. Hence,
the average capital generated by the ensemble is
〈C〉 = 〈C | pi〉 . (5)
Denoting the probabilities of wining or losing in a certain game by Pwin and
Plose it is easily noticed that
Pwin + Plose = 1,
Pwin − Plose = 〈C〉 ,
so that
Pwin =
1
2
(1 + 〈C〉). (6)
3 Probability Transition Matrix
3.1 Asynchronous case
Probability transition matrix for game A may be easily derived from the one
corresponding to game B, so the later will be derived first. Since at each
moment of time only one player plays and consequently changes the state, the
change may be represented by a Hamming distance between the initial (i) and
the final (f) state of player k:
dH =
N¯∑
s=0
|ik − fk| ,
5
where N¯ = M × N, the number of players. Since dH may be either 0 or 1,
each case will be considered separately.
3.1.1 case 1: dH = 0
If the ensemble is in state s, then the k-th player is in state sk. State s of the
ensemble also defines the neighborhood ηk : (sj−1 sk−1 sj+1 sk+1) of the k-th
player, which in turn determines the probability of winning. The ensemble
initially in state i may switch to the state f = i in one of N¯ different ways as
a result of one of the players switching from state ik to fk = ik, so that the
probability of transition is equal to the sum of probabilities of independent
events
Tfi = w(i→ f) =
1
N
N¯∑
k=1
w(ik, fk), (7)
with
w(ik, fk) =


1− p(B)ηk , when fk = 0
p(B)ηk , when fk = 1
3.1.2 case 1: dH = 1
The k-th player switches from state ik to state fk (ik 6= fk), with probability
Tfi = w(i→ f) =
1
N
w(ik, fk).
The size of the probability transition matrix becomes large even for the case of
nine players arranged in a 3× 3 lattice since the dimension of the state space
is 29 = 512, imposing a 512 ×512 matrix size. As in the one-dimensional case
this matrix is sparse for the asynchronous game B while for synchronous game
all the elements are non-zero.
3.1.3 An example
We illustrate the evaluation of T
(B)
fi for the simple case of 3× 3 lattice, in the
case of transition from state 85 to state 95, i.e.


0 0 1
0 1 0
1 0 1


= (0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1)→


0 0 1
0 1 1
1 1 1


= (0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1).
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Evaluation of expression 7 for this case yields:
T 95 85 =
1
9
[prob(0→ 0) + prob(0→ 0) + prob(1→ 1)
+prob(0→ 0) + prob(1→ 1) + prob(0→ 1)
+prob(1→ 1) + prob(0→ 1) + prob(1→ 1)
= [(1− p2) + (1− p2) + p1 + (1− p2) + p0+
p3 + p1 + p3 + p2
=
1
9
(3 + p0 + 2p1 − 2p2 + 2p3).
Other elements may be derived in a similar manner. The probability transition
matrix for game A is easily obtained by replacing p(B)ηk with p
(A), for each
η ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}.
3.2 Synchronous case
Since at each moment of time all players play simultaneously and consequently
change each individual state, the probability of transition is
Tfi =
N¯∏
k=1
w(ik, fk),
where transition probabilities are
w(ik, fk) =


1− p(B)ηk , when fk = 0
p(B)ηk , when fk = 1
.
3.2.1 Combination of games A and B
Combination of games A and B may be played, as in the one-dimensional
model, in two distinctive ways. First, players may simultaneously play game
A or game B in any predetermined or random order, and this case is denoted
by A+B. The other possibility is that each player may at each turn of the
game chose randomly whether to play game A or game B, this case being
denoted as A*B. In both cases the paradoxical result that games A+B or
A*B may be winning while each game, A and B, individually losing persists,
however for different sets of probabilities figuring in game B.
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4 Results of simulations
4.1 Capital accumulation as a function of time
In Figs.2 and 3 the averaged capital as a function of time in games A, B and
A+B for the asynchronous and synchronous cases is shown, respectively. In
the synchronous case, Fig. 3, the paradoxical property becomes visible in a
very short amount of time, while the asynchronous case displays paradoxical
property following a short period during which game A fluctuates around a
fair outcome while game B experiences a transient in the positive direction.
4.2 Probability space defining the paradox
The results were obtained both by direct numerical simulation and calculations
based on the analytically derived expressions for the probability transition
matrix. As in the one-dimensional setting, the results show perfect agreement
as illustrated in Fig. 4, where the averaged capital isis shown as a function of
probability p
(B)
1 for the case asynchronously played games. In this diagram a
A*B choice for the alternation of two games is applied. In all simulations the
capital pertaining to the asynchronous games was averaged over 10 000 time
steps and over 1000 runs (ensembles). For synchronous case, since all players
play at each time step, the averaging was performed over 1000 time steps
and over 200 runs (ensembles). In the case of calculations based on analytical
expressions for the probability transition matrix, the capital was averaged
as in the case of synchronous games. Simulations of the capital evolution in
the five dimensional probability space show that the paradox occurs for a
very large number of sets and in order to illustrate this, we concentrate on
the appearance of the paradox in the vicinity of the voter model values, i.e.
p
(B)
0 = 0, p
(B)
1 = 0.25, p
(B)
2 = 0.5, p
(B)
3 = 0.75 and p
(B)
4 = 1. The obtained
probability sets are displayed in Table 1.
As a further illustration, the probability space spanned by p
(B)
1 and p
(B)
3 and
the corresponding paradoxical range are shown in Fig. 4. Figs. 6, 7, 8, 9 and
10 further illustrate the paradoxical property of the games through capital
evolution as a function of each of the probabilities determining the state of
the player who is about to play game B. In each of the figures one probability
was varied while the remaining four were kept constant. The region of the
paradox is enlarged and shown in the right diagram.
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p
(B)
0 p
(B)
1 p
(B)
2 p
(B)
3 p
(B)
4
0 0.15 0.6 0.75 0.95
0 0.15 0.6 0.8 0.8
0 0.2 0.55 0.8 0.65
0 0.2 0.6 0.8 0.85
0 0.2 0.6 0.7 0.95
0 0.2 0.6 0.75 0.8
0 0.25 0.6 0.65 0.95
0 0.25 0.6 0.7 0.8
0 0.25 0.6 0.75 0.85
0.05 0.15 0.6 0.75 0.9
0.05 0.15 0.55 0.8 0.8
0.1 0.2 0.6 0.7 0.8
Table 1
Probabilities featured in game B leading to the paradox in the vicinity of the voter
model values
4.3 Capital accumulation and lattice size
In the next two figures we compare the way the capital, as a function of prob-
ability p
(B)
2 , depends on the size of the lattice. In Fig. 11, this dependence is
presented for the asynchronous game B. In the cases where periodic bound-
ary conditions have large influence (small lattice sizes, e.g. 3× 3) the capital
increases linearly and in a noticeable manner. The same behavior is seen for
large lattice sizes (e.g. 100 × 100 and larger) were periodic boundary condi-
tions do not play an important role. However for intermediate lattice sizes
(from 10 × 10 up to 50 × 50) the capital increases substantially only in the
(approximate) range 0.5 ≤ p
(B)
2 ≤ 0.7. For values on both sides of this range
capital increases very slowly.
For synchronous games this dependence on the lattice size is not distinct, so
that the capital increases, as a function of probability p
(B)
2 , in almost the same
manner and up to the same value for all lattice sizes (Fig. 12).
It is interesting that asynchronous game B played at intermediate lattice sizes
leads to the same functional dependence of the capital on the probability p
(B)
2
as in synchronous games.
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4.4 Percolation phase transition
The dynamics of the games suggests that one should investigate whether there
is a connection between the paradoxical property of the games with the perco-
lation phase transition. A typical snapshot of the configuration of ”winners”
and losers” which arises during the course of the game B is shown in Fig. 13.
In Fig. 14 we superpose two graphs. The first one shows the capital depen-
dence in games B, A+B and A*B on the probability p
(B)
2 , so that the area of
the paradox ( C(B) < 0 and C(A+B) > 0 or C(A∗B) < 0) is clearly visible. The
second graph illustrates the probability of appearance of the spanning cluster
in game B as a function of p
(B)
2 . The percolation phase transition occurs at
the value of p
(B)
2C ≃ 0.64 very close to the range of p
(B)
2 values for which the
paradox occurs (approximately 0.59 ≤ p
(B)
2 ≤ 0.62) however it is clear that the
paradox is not present at p
(B)
2C . The simulation presented here as a paradigm
of the typical property of the games, was performed for the 50 × 50 lattice
size.
5 Conclusion
Following a discrete-time Markov chain model of one-dimensional cooperative
Parrondo’s games introduced previously, we analyzed the we analyzed the two-
dimensional setting characterized by players arranged at a two-dimensional
regular lattice. It was shown that the alternation of two losing games, on av-
erage, leads to a winning outcome and the number of probability sets for which
this apparently paradoxical property occurs is very large. In particular, there
is a number of probability sets very close to the values characteristic of the
voter model, suggesting possible applications in the social or economic frame-
work. Moreover, asynchronous games displaying the paradoxical property are
sensitive to the lattice size (number of players), while this is not the case
with the synchronous games. For medium sized lattices (between 10 ×10 to
50 ×50), the capital evolution as a function of one of the probabilities defining
game B behaves in a similar manner for asynchronous and synchronous games.
Percolation phase transition for game B occurs at the probability value very
close to the probability values for which the paradox occurs, however they
seem to be unrelated phenomena. No fronts or patterns were observed at the
paradoxical probability values.
An interesting extension of this work pertains to the games where players
are arranged on a network nodes and where links with the neighbors may be
rewired according to specific rules[7]. In this setting an addition of rewiring
probability in game B introduces interesting novel features of the dynamics
10
along with the existence of the paradox.
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